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11 Introduction
This paper studies two well known classes of preferences: the variational
preferences of Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini [11]a n dt h ep r o b a -
bilistically sophisticated preferences of Machina and Schmeidler [12].
Variational preferences are a very broad class of preferences that allow
for modeling choices consistent with the Ellsberg [5]p a r a d o x . T h i sc l a s s
of preferences includes the maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences of
Gilboa and Schmeidler [6], where the decision maker has a set of priors,
rather than a unique probability, as well as many other classes of preferences
that violate separability across states.
The notion of probabilistic sophistication means that the decision maker
bases his choices on probabilistic beliefs. This class includes expected utility,
as well as many nonexpected utility criteria that allow for modeling the Allais
[1] paradox and related violations of linearity in probabilities.
In many situations involving ambiguity and ambiguity aversion, such as
in the Ellsberg paradox, there exist events to which the decision maker at-
taches unambiguous probabilities. In principle, a decision maker could be
probabilistically sophisticated but nonexpected utility over such events. The
question that this paper studies is to what extent it is possible to model such
attitude using variational preferences.
Marinacci [13]s t u d i e dt h i sq u e s t i o nf o rt h eM E Up r e f e r e n c e sa n ds h o w e d
that under an assumption that all the probabilities in the set of priors agree
on some event, probabilistic sophistication is equivalent to expected utility.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First it characterizes Marinacci’s
assumption axiomatically: it shows that it is equivalent to the existence of
an event A such that the independence axiom holds for bets on A.I nl i g h to f
this theorem, Marinacci’s result can be interpreted as pointing to the inabil-
ity of MEU preferences to accommodate expected utility and nonexpected
utility within the same model. The second contribution of this paper is an
extension (using di↵erent proof techniques) of Marinacci’s result to the class
2of variational preferences: they too are unable to accommodate expected
utility and nonexpected utility within the same model.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Setting
Let S be the set of states of the world with a sigma algebra ⌃ of subsets of S.
Let  (S) denote the set of all ﬁnitely additive probability distributions on
(S,⌃) and let   (S) denote the set of all countably additive probabilities.
Let X be the set of consequences, assumed to be a convex subset of a vector
space. An act is a ⌃-measurable and ﬁnite-valued mapping f : S ! X that
attaches a consequence to each possible state. Let F denote the set of all
acts. The preferences % are deﬁned on F.I f f,g 2Fand A ✓ S,t h e n
fAg denotes an act with fAg(s)=f(s)i fs 2 A and fAg(s)=g(s)i fs/ 2 A.
For any algebra of events A✓⌃l e tFA denote the set of acts in F that are
measurable with respect to A.I n p a r t i c u l a r , i f A = {;,A,Ac,S} for some
A 2 ⌃, then FA is denoted simply by FA.
2.2 Probabilistic sophistication
The notion of probabilistic sophistication means that the decision maker
treats subjective uncertainty as if it was objective risk; he cares only about
the probabilities of events, not the events themselves.1 Such decision maker
formulates a subjective probability measure on the state space. Any two acts
that imply the same distribution over outcomes are being treated in the same
way. More formally, a preference is probabilistically sophisticated if there ex-
ists a nonatomic probability measure q 2  (S)s u c ht h a tf o ra n yt w oa c t sf
1This notion was introduced by Machina and Schmeidler [12] and subsequently ex-
tended by Grant [7] and Chew and Sagi [4]; the latter approach is being adopted here.
3and g
q
 
s 2 S | f(s)=x
 
= q
 
s 2 S | g(s)=x
 
for all x 2 X ) f ⇠ g.
2.3 Variational Preferences
The variational preferences,i n t r o d u c e da n da x i o m a t i z e db yM a c c h e r o n ie ta l .
[11], are represented by
V (f)=m i n
p2 S
Z
S
u(f)dp + c(p), (1)
where the function c :  ( S) ! [0,1]i sc o n v e x ,w e a k ⇤ lower semicontinuous,
and grounded (takes value zero for some p 2  (S)); and u : X ! R is a
nonconstant and a ne utility function. For the purpose of this paper it will
be also assumed that u is unbounded. An important subclass of variational
preferences are those where the minimization is over the set of countably
additive probabilities. Such preferences are called continuous variational
preferences.
Ac l a s s i ce x a m p l eo fv a r i a t i o n a lp r e f e r e n c e sa r em a x m i ne x p e c t e du t i l i t y
preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler [6]w i t hr e p r e s e n t a t i o n
V (f) = min
p2P
Z
S
u(f)dp, (2)
where P is a nonempty, convex, and weak⇤ compact set of probabilities in
 (S). Formula (2)i sas p e c i a lc a s eo f( 1)f o r
cMEU(p)=
8
<
:
0f o r p 2 P
1 for p/ 2 P.
A special case of both of those classes are Anscombe–Aumann expected util-
4ity preferences represented by
V (f)=
Z
S
u(f)dp;
in this case the set P is a singleton composed of p.
3 Results
3.1 Binary Independence
Deﬁnition 1. (Nontrivial event) An event A 2 ⌃i snontrivial if and only if
there exists x,y 2 X with x   xAy   y.
Axiom A1 postulates the existence of a nontrivial event A such that the
independence axiom holds for bets on A.
Axiom A1 (Binary Independence). There exists a nontrivial event A 2 ⌃
such that
f ⇠ g )
1
2
f +
1
2
h ⇠
1
2
g +
1
2
h for all f,g,h 2F A.
Recall that acts in FA have the form xAy,t h a ti s ,t h e ya r eb e t sb a s e d
on A.M o r eg e n e r a l l y ,a na l g e b r aA✓⌃ is nontrivial if and only if it contains
an o n t r i v i a le v e n t .F o re x a m p l e ,i fA is a nontrivial event, then the algebra
{;,A,Ac,S} is nontrivial. It is easily seen that the Binary Independence
axiom can be equivalently formulated in terms of the existence of a nontrivial
subagebra A of ⌃ such that independence holds on FA.
3.2 Maxmin Expected Utility
The main result of this paper determines the extent to which the variational
preferences can be used for modeling the Allais paradox. Marinacci [13]
showed that for the subclass of maxmin expected utility preferences this
5extent is limited. They collapse to expected utility preferences under an
assumption of agreement of probabilities
Assumption 1. There exists an event A 2 ⌃s u c h0<p (A)=p0(A) < 1f o r
all p,p0 2 P.
This assumption means that there exists an event A such that any two
measures belonging to the set of priors P agree on A.T h i s a s s u m p t i o n
is expressed in terms of the representation; the following result provides a
behavioral characterization of Assumption 1.
Theorem 1. Suppose that % is a maxmin expected utility preference. As-
sumption 1 holds if and only if Axiom A1 holds.
The main result of this paper, Theorem 3 below, extends the result of
Marinacci [13]t ot h ew h o l ec l a s so fv a r i a t i o n a lp r e f e r e n c e su n d e ra na p p r o -
priately extended notion of agreement of probabilities.
3.3 Variational Preferences
In principle, there are two possible extensions of this assumption to cost
functions taking values other than zero and inﬁnity, i.e., to the whole class
of variational preferences. They both reduce to the assumption of Marinacci
[13] for the subclass of maxmin expected utility preferences.
Assumption 2. There exists an event A 2 ⌃s u c ht h a ti fc(p),c(p0) < 1,
then 0<p(A)=p0(A)<1.
This assumption means that there exists an event A such that any two
measures that the decision maker considers to be at all plausible (i.e., having
ﬁnite cost) attach the same probability to A.S i m i l a r l yt om a x m i ne x p e c t e d
utility preferences, Axiom A1 provides a characterization of this assumption.
Theorem 2. Suppose that % is an unbounded variational preference. As-
sumption 2 holds if and only if Axiom A1 is satisﬁed.
6Assumption 2 is relatively strong, especially in cases where the set of
plausible measures is large. A further generalization of Assumption 1 is the
following.
Assumption 3. For any r   0t h e r ee x i s t sa ne v e n tAr 2 ⌃ such that if
c(p)=c(p0)=r,t h e n0<p (Ar)=p0(Ar) < 1.
This assumption requires that any two measures with the same cost agree
on some event. This assumption is weaker than Assumption 2 because the
event on which the measures have to agree can vary with the cost level.
This requirement is more in the spirit of variational preferences where the
decision maker considers various classes of probability distributions, each
with a di↵erent cost. The agreement event can be di↵erent for each such
class, rather than being uniform. This assumption is easier to verify given
the speciﬁc functional from of c,w h i c hm a yb eh e l p f u li ns o m ec a s e s ,f o r
example in applications, where a subclass of variational preferences is being
studied.2
The main result of this paper, Theorem 3 shows that even the weaker As-
sumption 3 is su cient. The proof does not follow from Marinacci [13], but
uses di↵erent techniques: it builds on the elegant characterization of proba-
bilistically sophisticated variational preferences obtained by Maccheroni et al.
[11].3
Theorem 3. Suppose that % is a continuous and unbounded variational
preference. The following three statements are equivalent
(i) % is probabilistically sophisticated and Assumption 3 holds
(ii) % is probabilistically sophisticated and Axiom A1 holds
2The axiomatic characterization of Assumption 3 within the class of general variational
preferences is an open question. For probabilistically sophisticated variational preferences,
however, Theorem 3 establishes the equivalence between Axiom A1 and Assumption 3.
3I would like to thank Simone Cerreia-Vioglio for pointing out that an alternative
proof could be obtained using a rearrangement invariance approach of Luxemburg [10].
The proof presented in this paper is elementary and does not rely on those results.
7(iii) % is an Anscombe–Aumann expected utility preference.
Remark 1. Strictly speaking, Theorem 3 is not a generalization of the result
of Marinacci [13]; his theorem holds also for ↵-MEU preferences, which—not
being uncertainty averse—do not belong to the class of variational prefer-
ences. Moreover, his results for maxmin expected utility preferences do not
rely on countable additivity.
Remark 2. Marinacci [13] shows that Assumption 1 cannot be weakened.
His Proposition 2 exhibits an example of MEU preferences that are proba-
bilistically sophisticated, yet not expected utility. Similarly, rank-dependent
expected utility preferences with a concave probability transformation func-
tion, see, e.g., Quiggin [14], Yaari [17], as well as many other probabilistically
sophisticated MEU preferences have this property.4 The existence of such
preferences is possible because they do not satisfy Axiom A1 (there are no
nontrivial events on which those preferences satisfy the independence axiom).
Such examples are inherited by Theorem 3;t h ec l a s so fs u c he x a m p l e si se v e n
larger, as it includes some variational but non-MEU preferences, notably the
multiplier preferences of Hansen and Sargent [9].5
Remark 3. In a recent paper Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and
Montrucchio [3] independently obtain similar results for the general class of
uncertainty averse preferences characterized by Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni,
Marinacci, and Montrucchio [2]. They work in terms of the analog of Assump-
tion 2 of this paper and do not consider weaker conditions like Assumption 3
in this paper. They also provide an axiomatic characterization of the analog
of Assumption 2. However, their characterization is di↵erent than the one
obtained in this paper: they ﬁrst derive an auxiliary incomplete ordering %⇤
4Grant and Kajii [8] characterize the class of probabilistically sophisticated MEU pref-
erences.
5Multiplier preferences, and more broadly divergence preferences with respect to a
nonatomic q 2   (S), are probabilistically sophisticated, but not expected utility, see
Maccheroni et al. [11].
8(the revealed unambiguous preference) and then uncover the unambiguous
event from that ordering. By contrast, Axiom A1 uncovers the unambiguous
event directly from the observable preference %.
Appendix: Proofs
Let B0(⌃) denote the set of all real-valued ⌃-measurable simple functions
and let B0(⌃,K)b et h es e to fa l lf u n c t i o n si nB0(⌃) that take values in a
convex set K ✓ R.
A Proof of Theorem 2
Verifying that Assumption 2 implies Axiom A1 is routine. Turn to su ciency
and deﬁne  2 := {⇡ 2 R2 | ⇡1   0,⇡ 2   0, and ⇡1+⇡2 =1 }.F o ra n yP ✓  2
let  P :  2 ! [0,1]b ed e ﬁ n e da s P(⇡)=0i f⇡ 2 P and 1 otherwise.
Since A is notrivial, there exists a nontrivial A 2A .L e tFA denote the set
of acts measurable with respect to {;,A,Ac,S}.
Step 1:T h e r e s t r i c t i o n o f % to FA satisﬁes Order, Mixture Continuity,
Monotonicity, and Independence, hence by the Anscombe–Aumann repre-
sentation theorem, it has a representation f 7! ⇡1v(f(A)) + ⇡2v(f(Ac)) for
all f 2F A where v : X ! R is an a ne function and ⇡ 2  2.S i n c ec o n s t a n t
acts belong to FA, the functions u and v are identical up to a positive a ne
transformation; choose v to coincide with u. Hence, the preference on the
set BA := {(aAb) 2 B0(⌃,u(X)) | a,b 2 R} induced by % is represented by
(aAb) 7! ⇡1a + ⇡2b.T h e r ei san a t u r a li s o m o r p h i s mb e t w e e nt h es e tBA and
the set (u(X))2.L e t%2 denote the induced preferences on (u(X))2.B yt h e
above, the preference %2 has a representation ¯ I(a,b)=a⇡1 + b⇡2.
Step 2:D e ﬁ n et h ef u n c t i o n⇧:  ( S) !  2 by ⇧(p)=( p(A),1 p(A)) and
observe that ⇧ is continuous because if a net p↵ !w⇤ p,t h e ni np a r t i c u l a r
p↵(A) ! p(A), so (p↵(A),1   p↵(A)) ! (p(A),1   p(A)); hence, ⇧(p↵) !
⇧(p). Observe that for any ⇡ 2  2 the set ⇧ 1(⇡)i san o n e m p t y ,c o n v e x ,a n d
9weak⇤ closed subset of  (S), hence it is weak⇤ compact. Deﬁne the function
ˆ c :  2 ! [0,1]b yˆ c(⇡): =m i n p2⇧ 1(⇡) c(p). Clearly, ˆ c is grounded, since c
is. Also, it is convex: ﬁx any ⇡,⇡0 2  2 and any ↵ 2 [0,1]. Let p 2 ⇧ 1(⇡)
and p0 2 ⇧ 1(⇡0) be such that ˆ c(⇡)=c(p)a n dˆ c(⇡0)=c(p0). From convexity
of c it follows that c(↵p +( 1  ↵)p0)  ↵c(p)+( 1  ↵)c(p0)  k.O n t h e
other hand, ⇧(↵p +( 1  ↵)p0)=↵⇡ +( 1  ↵)⇡0,s oˆ c(↵⇡ +( 1  ↵)⇡0) 
c(↵p +( 1  ↵)p0). The function ˆ c is also lower semicontinuous; to see that
it is necessary to prove that the set ˆ Ck := {⇡ 2  2 | ˆ c(⇡)  k} is closed for
any k 2 [0,1]. Since the function c is weak⇤ lower semicontinuous, the set
Ck := {p 2  (S) | c(p)  k} is weak⇤ closed and therefore weak⇤ compact
for any k 2 [0,1]. Since continuous functions carry compact sets to compact
sets the set ⇧(Ck)i sc o m p a c tf o ra n yk 2 [0,1] and therefore closed Finally,
observe that ⇧(Ck)= ˆ Ck for all k 2 [0,1]. For any ⇡ 2 ⇧(Ck)t h e r ee x i s t s
p 2 Ck such that ⇧(p)=⇡.B y d e ﬁ n i t i o n , t h i s m e a n s t h a t c(p)  k and
p 2 ⇧ 1(⇡). Hence, ˆ c(⇡)  c(p)  k.C o n v e r s e l y , f o r a n y ⇡ 2 ˆ Ck,b y
deﬁnition ˆ c(⇡)  k.C h o o s ep 2 ⇧ 1(⇡)s u c ht h a tˆ c(⇡)=c(p). This means
that c(p)  k,i . e . ,p 2 Ck, and ⇧(p)=⇡;i tf o l l o w st h a t⇡ 2 ⇧(Ck). This
establishes the weak⇤ lower semicontinuity of ˆ c. Together with convexity and
groundedness establishes that ˆ c is a cost function in the sense of Maccheroni
et al. [11].
Step 3:D e ﬁ n eI : B0(⌃,u(X)) ! R by I(⇠): =m i n p2 (S)
R
⇠ dp+c(p). De-
ﬁne ˆ I :( u(X))2 ! R by ˆ I(a,b): =I(aAb). Hence, ˆ I represents %2.O b s e r v e
that ˆ I(a,b)=m i n p2 (S) ap(A)+bp(Ac)+c(p)=m i n ⇡2 2 minp2⇧ 1(⇡) a⇡1 +
b⇡2+c(p)=m i n ⇡2 2 a⇡1+b⇡2+ˆ c(⇡). Thus, ¯ I and ˆ I there are two variational
representations of %2.B y P r o p o s i t i o n 6 o f M a c c h e r o n i e t a l . [ 11], ˆ c =  {⇡}
for some ⇡ 2  2.S u p p o s et h e r ee x i s tp,q 2  (S)s u c ht h a tc(p),c(q) < 1
and p(A) 6= q(A). Deﬁne ⇡p := ⇧(p)a n d⇡q := ⇧(q)a n do b s e r v et h a t
ˆ c(⇡p)=m i n p02⇧ 1(⇡p) c(p0)  c(p) < 1 and ˆ c(⇡q)=m i n p02⇧ 1(⇡q) c(p0) 
c(q) < 1.C o n t r a d i c t i o nw i t h⇡p 6= ⇡q and ˆ c =  {⇡} for some ⇡ 2  2.T h u s ,
p(A)=q(A)f o ra l lp,q 2  (S)s u c ht h a tc(p),c(q) < 1.T h en o n t r i v i a l i t y
10of A implies that this common value is strictly between zero and one.
B Proof of Theorem 1
Let I : B0(S,u(X)) ! R be equal to I(⇠)=m i n p2P
R
⇠ dp for some nonempty
convex and weak⇤ compact subset of  (S). Proceed with Steps 1 and 2 as
in the proof of Theorem 2.O b s e r v et h a tˆ c obtained in Step 2 is equal to  P2
for some nonempty, compact and convex set P 2 ✓  2.P r o c e e dw i t hS t e p3
as in the proof of Theorem 2 except that instead of relying on Proposition
6o fM a c c h e r o n ie ta l .[ 11], rely instead on Theorem 1 (b) of Gilboa and
Schmeidler [6]t oc o n c l u d et h a tP 2 = {⇡}.
CP r o o f o f Theorem 3
Let S be a set and let ⌃ be a sigma algebra of its events. Let   (S)d e n o t et h e
set of all countably additive probability measures on (S,⌃). Let q 2   (S)
and let L1(S,⌃,q)d e n o t et h es e to fa l ln o n n e g a t i v e⌃ - m e a s u r a b l ef u n c t i o n s
on S with
R
S f dq =1 .F o rf,g 2 L1(S,⌃,q)d e ﬁ n ef ⇠cx g i↵
q(s 2 S | f(s)  t)=q(s 2 S | g(s)  t)
for any t   0. Similarly, for any measures p,p0 2   (S)d e ﬁ n ep ⇠cx p0 i↵
dp
dq ⇠cx
dp0
dq .F o r p 2   (S), the set O(p)={p0 2   (S,⌃) | p0 ⇠cx p} is
called the orbit of p.As e to fm e a s u r e s  ✓   (q)i sc a l l e dorbit-closed i↵
p 2   ) O(p) ✓  .
Lemma 1. Let f 2 L1(S,⌃,q) and let F,G 2 ⌃ be disjoint events, with
q(F)=q(G). Then, there exists g 2 L1(S,⌃,q) such that f = g on (F [G)c,
R
F f dq =
R
G g dq, and f ⇠cx g.
11Proof. For each n 2 N and for 1  k  n2n deﬁne sets
nF 0 = {s 2 F | f(s)   n}, nF k =
⇢
s 2 F
       
k   1
2n  f(s) 
k
2n
 
,
nG0 = {s 2 G | f(s)   n}, nGk =
⇢
s 2 G
 
     
k   1
2n  f(s) 
k
2n
 
.
Because q is nonatomic, it is also convex-ranged, see, e.g., Villegas [16]. Thus,
for each n,p a r t i t i o n s{nF 0
k}n2n
k=0 of F and {nG0
k}n2n
k=0 of G can be constructed
such that
q(F
0
n,k)=q(Gn,k)a n dq(G
0
n,k)=q(Fn,k)
for all 0  k  n2n and
(n+1)G
0
(2k) ✓ (n+1)G
0
(k) and (n+1)G
0
(2k+1) ✓ (n+1)G
0
(k)
for all 0  k  n2n and n 2 N.
Deﬁne functions
fn =
n2n X
k=1
✓
k   1
2n 1nFk
◆
+ n1nFk + f|(E[G)c +
n2n X
k=1
✓
k   1
2n 1nGk
◆
+ n1nGk,
gn =
n2n X
k=1
✓
k   1
2n 1nF0
k
◆
+ n1nF0
k + f|(E[G)c +
n2n X
k=1
✓
k   1
2n 1nG0
k
◆
+ n1nG0
k.
Observe, that functions fn satisfy 0  fn  fn+1,a n dc o n v e r g ep o i n t w i s e
to f.S i m i l a r l y ,f u n c t i o n sgn satisfy 0  gn  gn+1.D e ﬁ n eg =l i m n!1 gn.
Observe that f = g on (E [ G)c.M o r e o v e r ,
R
S fn dq =
R
S gn dq,s ob yt h e
Monotone Convergence Theorem
R
S f dq =
R
S g dq.
12To see that f ⇠cx g,l e tt   0a n dd e ﬁ n es e t s
An = {s 2 S | fn(s)  t},A = {s 2 S | f(s)  t},
Bn = {s 2 S | gn(s)  t},B= {s 2 S | g(s)  t},
Verify, that by construction of fn and gn An # A, Bn # B,a n dq(An)=
q(Bn)f o ra l ln.B y c o u n t a b l e a d d i t i v i t y o f q,l i m n!1 q(An)=q(A)a n d
limn!1 q(Bn)=q(B).
Lemma 2. Suppose that   ✓   (q) is an orbit-closed set of measures. Sup-
pose also that there exists A 2 ⌃ such that 0 <p (A)=p0(A) < 1 for all
p,p0 2  . Then  ={q}.
Proof. Let ↵ = q(A). Observe, that wlog ↵  1
2, because if all measures in
 a g r e eo nA,t h e nt h e ya l s oa g r e eo nAc. Also, if ↵ =0 ,t h e nf o ra n yp 2  
q(A)=0) p(A)=0 ,c o n t r a d i c t i n gt h ea s s u m p t i o n .T h u s ,↵ 2 (0, 1
2].
Step 1: p(E)=p(A) for all p 2   and for all events E 2 ⌃ with q(E)=↵.
Let E 2 ⌃b es u c ht h a tq(E)=↵ and observe that q(A   E)=q(E  
A). Let p 2  a n dd e ﬁ n ef =
dp
dq.B y Lemma 1 applied to (E   A)a n d
(A E), there exists g 2 L1(S,⌃,q)s u c ht h a tf = g on (A[E)c [(A\E),
R
(E A) f dq =
R
(A E) g dq,a n df ⇠cx g.D e ﬁ n e m e a s u r e p0 2   (S,⌃) by
p0(F)=
R
F g dq and observe that p0 ⇠cx p.M o r e o v e r ,p(E   A)=p0(A   E)
and p(A\E)=p0(A\E). Thus, p(E)=p(E  A)+p(A\E)=p0(A E)+
p0(A \ E)=p0(A)=p(A), where the last equality holds by orbit-closedness
of  .
Step 2: p(F)=p(F 0) for all p 2   and for all disjoint events F,F0 2 ⌃ with
q(F)=q(F 0)= <↵ .
Observe that  <1
2,s o↵    <1   2 .T h u s , b y r a n g e - c o n v e x i t y o f
q,t h e r ee x i s t sH ✓ (F [ F 0)c with q(H)=↵    .B y S t e p 1 a p p l i e d t o
sets F [ H and F 0 [ H,i tf o l l o w st h a tp(F)+p(H)=p(F [ H)=p(A)=
p(F 0 [ H)=p(F 0)+p(H); hence, p(F)=p(F 0).
Step 3: p(G)=q(G) for all p 2   and for G 2 ⌃.
13Let   = q(G)a n df o re a c hn 2 N deﬁne kn =s u p {k | k
n   }.O b s e r v e ,
that limn!1
kn
n =  .F o re a c hn 2 N,b yr a n g e - c o n v e x i t yo fq,t h e r ee x i s t s
ap a r t i t i o n{F1,...,F n} of F such that q(Fk)= 1
n for k =1 ,...,n,s e t s
F1,...,F kn ✓ G,a n ds e t sFkn+2,...,F n ✓ Gc.B y S t e p 2 , p(Fk)= 1
n for
k =1 ,...n,s okn
n  p(G)  kn+1
n .B yl e t t i n gn to inﬁnity, p(G)= .
Proof of Theorem 3. To see (i) ) (ii), observe that for any r 2 R+ let
Cr = {p 2  (S,⌃) | c(p)=r} denote the level set of the cost function c.
Observe that
V (f)= m i n
p2 (S)
Z
S
(u   f)dp + c(p)=m i n
r2R+
min
p2Cr
Z
S
(u   f)dp + r.
By weak monotone continuity and the proof of Corollary 4 in Sarin and
Wakker [15]i tf o l l o w st h a t% is probabilistically sophisticated with respect
to some q 2   (S). By Theorem 14 of Maccheroni et al. [11], if % is proba-
bilistically sophisticated with respect to q 2   (S), then c is rearrangement
invariant, i.e., p ⇠cx p0 ) c(p)=c(p0)f o ra l lp,p0 2  (S). Thus, each Cr
is orbit-closed. Therefore, by Assumption 3 and Lemma 2, Cr = {q} for all
r 2 R+.T h u s ,
V (f)=m i n
r2R+
Z
S
(u   f)dq + r =
Z
S
(u   f)dq.
The direction (ii) ) (iii)i st r i v i a l . T os e e( iii) ) (i), observe that by
Theorem 2 Axiom A1 implies Assumption 2,w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e sAssump-
tion 3.
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